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ABSTRACT: This note is a comment on a recent paper in this journal by Moti Mizrahi. 
Mizrahi claims that the factivity of knowledge entails that knowledge requires epistemic 
certainty. But the argument that Mizrahi presents does not proceed from factivity to 
certainty. Instead, it proceeds from a premise about the relationship between grounds 
and knowledge to the conclusion about certainty. 
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In “You Can’t Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty,” Moti Mizrahi 
presents an argument for an infallibilist theory of knowledge.1 Mizrahi claims that 
the factivity of knowledge entails that knowledge is epistemic certainty. But the 
argument that Mizrahi presents does not in fact proceed from the factivity of 
knowledge to knowledge being epistemic certainty. Rather, the argument proceeds 
from an assumption about the relation between grounds and knowledge to the 
conclusion about epistemic certainty. 
Mizrahi’s argument is as follows: 
1) If S knows that p on the grounds that e, then p cannot be false given e. 
2) If p cannot be false given e, then e makes p epistemically certain. 
3) Therefore, if S knows that p on the grounds that e, then e makes p 
epistemically certain.2 
As indicated, this argument begins with a premise about the grounds on 
which the knowing subject knows a proposition. But this is quite different from 
the claim that knowledge is factive. It is a claim about the relation between 
grounds (or evidence) and knowing. 
More specifically, Mizrahi explains that: “To say that knowledge is factive is 
to say that, if S knows that p, then p is true.” In other words, knowledge is factive 
in the sense that knowledge requires truth. It is not possible to know a proposition 
if that proposition is false. Another way of stating the point is perhaps to say that 
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knowledge is sensitive to the facts. If what one purports to know gets the facts 
wrong, then one does not know. 
Now it is important to notice that the claim that knowledge is factive says 
nothing about a relation between grounds and knowledge. All that is required for 
knowledge to be factive is that the item of knowledge in question be true. There is 
no mention here of grounds or evidence. The only thing relevant to factivity is 
truth. 
This may only be a small point. But it does seem to show that it is not quite 
right to claim that the factivity of knowledge entails that knowledge is epistemic 
certainty. The work is being done, not by the factivity of knowledge, but by the 
relation between grounds and knowledge. 
 
